Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1978

State of Utah v. Willie Mae Walker : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Richard J. Leedy; Attorney for Appellant;
Attorney General's Office; Attorney for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State v. Walker, No. 15568 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1019

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

•

'

'-~-J;

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15568

WILLIE MAE WALKER, aka
DELL WALKER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE PETER F. LEARY, JUDGE
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
MICHAEL L. DEAMER
Deputy Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney GeReral
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Attorneys for Respondent
RICHARD J. LEEDY
610 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Attorney for Appellant

~'

,,

IN THE SUPRID1E COURT OF THE

-vs-

!

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

·i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE------------- 1
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT------------------ 1
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL------------------------- 2
STATEHENT OF FACTS------------------------------ 2
ARGUMENT
POINT I:
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE
DEFENDANT COULD BE CONVICTED
OF THE CRIHE OF POSSESSION
OF NARCOTICS ~11TH THE INTENT
TO DISTRIBUTE-------------- 6
POINT II: THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY
REFUSED TO ALLOW TESTIMONY
FROM THE WITNESS JAHES
HOUSLEY THAT ROBERT WESTLEY
OCCUPIED THE ROOM IN WHICH
THE HEROIN WAS DISCOVERED-- 16
POINT IIA: EVEN IF SUCH TESTIMONY FROM
HOUSLEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN
ALLOWED, IT WAS A HARMLESS
ERROR FOR THE COURT TO
REFUSE TO ALLOW IT--------- 20
POINT III: THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED
TO GIVE THE DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NOS.
1 AND 3 CONCERNING ACCESS
TO OR EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OF
A ROOM WHERE NARCOTICS ARE
FOUND---------------------- 23
POINT IV: THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF
EVIDENCE FROM THE UPPER
FLOOR OF APPELLANT'S
PREMISES WERE BOTH LAWFUL,
AND SUCH EVIDENCE SHOULD
BE PERMITTED AT TRIAL------ 26
POINT IVA: IT IS CLEAR THAT THERE WAS
COMMON USAGE BY APPELLANT'S
ASSOCIATES AND ROOMERS OF
ALL ROOMS ON THE SECOND
FLOOR---------------------- 30

-i-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Continued)
Page
POINT IVB: OUTWARD APPEARANCE DID NOT
INDICATE NOR WAS THERE ANY
LICENSE TO INDICATE THAT
THE UPPER FLOOR WAS A HOTEL,
APARTMENT BUILDING OR
ROOMING HOUSE-----------------35
POINT IVC: SEARCHES MUST BE JUDGED
ACCORDING TO WHAT FAIRMINDED PERSONS WOULD REGARD
AS PROPER IN DETER1'1INING WHAT
IS REASONABLE UNDER THE
FOURTH M1ENDMENT REQUIREMENTS-37
POINT V:
EVIDENCE ~ffiY PROPERLY BE
SEIZED WHEN IN THE COURSE OF
A LEGAL SEARCH OFFICERS
INADVERTENTLY COME ACROSS
INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE IN
PLAIN VIEW--------------------38
CONCLUSION-----------------------------------------43
CASES CITED
Blakely v. State, 542 P.2d 857 (Wyo. 1975)--------- 7
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194,
10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)--------------------17
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct.
2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)--------------39
Cooper v. Foresters Underwriters, Inc., 123 Utah
215, 257 P.2d 540 (1953)-----------------20
Evans v. Gaisford, 122 Utah 156, 24J P.2d 431
(1952)-----------------------------------19
In ReG., 64 Misc.2d 129, 314 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1970)--35
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725,
4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960)---------------------27-29
Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139
(Utah 1977)------------------------------19
Martini v. State, 200 Md. 609, 92 A.2d 456 (1952)--35
Mulligan v. State and Richardson v. State, 513
P.2d 180 (Wyo. 1973)--------------------- 7
Olson v. Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co.,
45 Wis.2d 569, 173 N.W.2d 599 (1970)-----19

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-ii-

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Continued)
Page
People v. Embry, 20 Ill.2d 331, 169 N.E.2d 767
(1960)--------------------------------People v. Flores, 155 Cal.App.2d 347, 318 P.2d
65 (1957)-----------------------------People v. Gorg, 157 Cal.App.2d 515, 321 P.2d
143 (1958)----------------------------People v. Lopez, 169 Cal.App.2d 344, 337 P.2d
570 (1959)----------------------------People v. Nettles, 23 Ill.2d 306, 178 N.E.2d 361
(1961)--------------------------------People v. Showers, 68 Cal.Rptr. 459, 440 P.2d
939 (1968)----------------------------Renner v. State, 187 Tenn. 647, 216 S.W.2d 345
(1948)--------------------------------Skyline v. Datacap, 545 P.2d 512 (Utah 1976)----State v. Allred, 16 Utah 2d 41, 395 P.2d 535
(1964)--------------------------------State v. Bankhead, 30 Utah 2d 135, 514 P.2d 800
(1973)--------------------------------State v. Condit, 101 Utah 558, 125 P.2d 801
(1942)--------------------------------State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517
(1968)--------------------------------State v. Eastrnond, 28 Utah 2d 129, 499 P.2d
276 (1972)----------------------------State v. Farnsworth, 30 Utah 2d 435, 519 P.2d 244
(1974)--------------------------------State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1977)------State v. Fort, 572 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977)--------State v. Hutcheson, No. 15390 (May 30, 1978)----State v. Jones, 202 Kansas 31, 446 P.2d 851
(1968)--------------------------------State v. Kaae, 30 Utah 2d 73, 513 P.2d 435
(1973)--------------------------------State v. Krohn, 15 Or.App. 63, 514 P.2d 1359
(1973)--------------------------------State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976)--------State v. Martinez, 28 Utah 2d 80, 498 P.2d 651
(1972)--------------------------------State v. Richards, 26 Utah 2d 318, 489 P.2d
422 (1971)----------------------------State v. Romeo, 42 Utah 46, 128 Pac. 530 (1912)-State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976)--------

20
22
31,32
7
21
7
33
20
41
7,14
24
37,38
41
38
38,40
29
24
42
38,41
7
38
41
38
24
15

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-iii-

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Continued)
Page
State v. Tapp, 26 Utah 2d 392, 490 P.2d 334
(1971)------------------------------State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170 P.2d 153
(1946)------------------------------State v. Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d 846
(1972)------------------------------State v. Villavicencio, 108 Ariz. 518, 502
P.2d 1337 (1972)--------------------State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 1977)------State v. Winters, 16 Utah 2d 139, 396 P.2d 872
(1964)------------------------------United State v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324 (C.A. 7,
1955)-------------------------------United States v. Santore, 290 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.
1952), cert. den. 365 u.s. 834, 81
s.ct. 749, 5 L.Ed.2d 744 (1960)-----warden v. Hayden, 387 u.s. 294, 87 s.ct. 1642,
18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967)---------------Watkins v. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406, 385 P.2d
155 (1963)--------------------------Williams v. Queen Fisheries, 2 Wash.App. 691,
469 P.2d 583 (1966)------------------

30,31
25
23,29
21
14,15
7

34,36
35,37
41
19
19

STATUTES CITED
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code
Code
Code
Code

Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.

§
§
§
§

58-37-2(26) (Supp. 1973)-----58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii) (Supp.l973)77-42-1 (1953)---------------77-54-7 (Supp. 1973)----------

24
,123
20
33

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
11 A.L.R.3d 1341-42---------------------------Jones on Evidence, 6th ed., sec. 4.1, p. 379--McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence,
2d ed., pp. 438-440-----------------Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 45----------------

34
18
18
18

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-ivLibrary Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15568

-vsWILLIE MAE WALKER, aka
DELL WALKER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEHENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with one count of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute
for value in violation of Utah Code Ann.

§

58-37-8(1) (a) (ii)

(Supp. 1973).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty
of one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute for value on September 1 and 2, 1977,
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and
for Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Peter F •. Leary,
presiding.

On September 26, 1977, appellant was sentenced for
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the indeterminate term (up to fifteen years) in the Utah
State Prison.

Appellant has since been released from

custody on a $25,000 bail bond.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the verdict
and judgment of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In early 1976, Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff
Michael George received information from a confidential
informant (CI No. 20) that the informant had purchased
heroin from one Del Walker, aka Willie

Mae Walker, at

511-513 West Second South in Salt Lake City, known as
Del's Cafe.

Later, on or about July 7, 1976, another

confidential informant (CI No. 30) informed Officer George
that heroin had been observed personally by the informant
on the premises of Del's Cafe and the informant described
to Officer George in detail the location and amounts of
the controlled substance.

A few days later on July 13,

1976, CI No. 30 again was an eyewitness to unlawful drug
trafficking on the premises (State's Exhibit A).
On July 14, 1976, Officer George swore out an
affidavit for search warrant before Salt Lake City Judge
M. D. Jones "on the persons of Del Walker and a male persoo

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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known only as "Billie," [Robert Westley] on the premises
known as 511 and 513 West 2nd South, adjoining buildings known
as Del's Cafe and rooms apurtenant thereto • • •
The two buildings at 511-513 West Second South
are actually one building that shares a party wall and
has one entrance that serves both sides of the premises.
The common structure is under the supervision of appellant
(Tr.66).

The buildings were not licensed or used as

apartments nor were there separate paying tenants living
there (Tr.66,176-177).

The officers who conducted the

search, therefore, had no prior notice of the upper floor's
use for occupancy by approximately six persons.

Appellant

allowed her friends to live on the upper floor free of
charge when they did not have money for rent (Tr.66,82-83,
176-177).
Officer George was able to give credibility to the
two confidential informants' information when he swore out
the affidavit.

This credence was based on past experience

by CI No. 20 who had provided reliable and verified information to police officers during the prior six months which
resulted in several arrests and one conviction.

Confidential

Informant No. 30 had made a previous "controlled purchase"
of heroin and had provided officers with valuable and
verified information such as telephone numbers, names and
addresses of known narcotics dealers (State's Exhibit A).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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On the basis of the above affidavit, a search
warrant was issued and on the same day--July 14, 1976--at
approximately 8:30 p.m., several police officers arrived
at Dels' Cafe, 511-513 West Second South (Tr.76-77).

Two

officers stationed themselves at the bar of the cafe to
keep the appellant and Fifi, the cook, from sounding a
buzzer that would ring upstairs.

While one officer

positioned himself outside at the door, other officers
including Jim Duncan, Deputy Sheriff; Randall Anderson,
Deputy Sheriff; and George; climbed the stairs to the
upper floor (Tr.39,78,93).
According to the testimony at trial, the upper
floor consisted of three bedrooms, one office, one storage
room, one bathroom, and one washroom (Tr.39-40).

None of

the three bedrooms had separate bathroom or kitchen
facilities and all of appellant's occupants shared a
common living room--pool table area and private upstairs
bar (Tr.40).

Common hallways, washroom and bathroom

were also jointly used by the occupants (Tr.40).

The only

room with a functioning lock was the room where the heroin
was discovered (Tr.l70).

Thus, the other six rooms were

open and freely accessable to all the occupants.
The police found the office

locked with "two or

three locks, " one of which was a deadbolt (Tr.40), and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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broke down the door.

Upon searching the room, they discovered

in a night stand a brown prescription-type bottle filled
with 56 balloons of a substance later ascertained as heroin
(Tr.41,105).

The heroin was estimated to have a street value

of approximately $1,680 (Tr.48).

Also found in the nighstand

were two envelopes addressed to Willie C. Walker at 511 West
Second South (Tr.66-69; Exhibit SP).

Woman's furs, jewelry,

clothing, a cash box, cash and business receipts were also
discovered in the room--all of which were later identified
as belonging to appellant (Tr.53,54,80,170).

The officers who

were present, according to their testimony, did not find any
men's clothing or shaving gear in the room (Tr.54,81,87,189).
However, appellant testified that clothing and toiletries
belonging to Robert Westley were in the room (Tr.l69).
The officers apprehended Robert Westley, who was
dressed in pajamas, in another room (Tr.94-95).

Four balloons

of heroin were found on Westley's person.
The officers read appellant her Miranda rights
(Tr.66,81), and questioned her regarding the room where the
suspected heroin was found.

Appellant indicated that she had

control over the second floor of the cafe, that none of the
rooms were being rented at that time and that she had
exclusive control over the locked room in which the drugs
were discovered (Tr.66,82-83,177,189).

Appellant also told

the officers that she had the only key to that room (Tr.82-83,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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189), which she claimed she used as a business office
(Tr.B3).
At trial, appellant denied telling the police
officers that she had exclusive control over the office
and also denied that she had the only key saying instead
that she merely had a key to the closet (Tr.l82).
By appellant's own testimony, one of the occupants,
Louie Shelton, was a user of heroin (Tr.J85).

She also

claimed that she knew Westley would often enter the office
with bad headaches, lock the door, remain there for about
45 minutes, then exit feeling much better (Tr.l71-172).
At the trial, appellant testified she did not use heroin
herself but she recognized the balloons inside the brown
prescription bottle (Exhibit 3P) as being the common method
of packaging heroin.

She testified, "You'll see it on the

floors, on the streets, every place.
them in that room.
now."

(Tr.l84-185).

But I hadn't seen

I see empty ones all the time right
The jury returned a unanimous verdict

against the defendant on September 2, 1977.

Judgment on

the verdict was entered by the judge September 26, 1977.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE
DEFENDANT COULD BE CONVICTED OF THE CRIME OF POSSESSION OF
NARCOTICS WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The theory upon which the State has proceeded
in this case is constructive possession.

Generally

courts have held that such may be proved by circumstantial
evidence.

In State v. Krohn, 15 Or.App. 63, 514 P.2d 1359

(1973), the court said:
"To prove constructive
possession of a dangerous drug
or narcotic, the state must show
that the defendant knowingly
exercised control of or the right
to control the unlawful substance
State v. Moore, 97 Or.App.Adv.Sh.
930, 511 P.2d 880 (1973), but this
may be shown by circumstantial
evidence." 514 P.2d at 1362.
See also People v. Lopez, 169 Cal.App.2d 344, 337 P.2d 570
(1959); People v. Showers, 68 Cal.Rptr. 459, 440 P.2d 939
(1968).

The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that dominion

and control neither means that the drug be found on the
person of the accused nor that the accused must have had
sole and exclusive possession of the narcotic.

State v.

Winters, 16 Utah 2d 139, 396 P.2d 872 (1964); State v.
Bankhead, 30 Utah 2d 135, 514 P.2d 800 (1973).
Appellant relies on Mulligan v. State and Richardson
v. State, Wyo., 513 P.2d 180 (1973) 1 to support her theory

1

In Mulligan, supra, the Wyoming court applies a very strict
standard on the use of circumstantial evidence in narcotics
cases. The standard of proof for circumstantial evidence
was such that it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis
other than that of guilt. This part of Mulligan was
specifically
overruled
bydigitization
the provided
court
in
Blakely
v.Library
State,
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney Law
Library. Funding for
by the
Institute
of Museum and
Services
Wyo., 542 Library
P.2d
857
(1975),
where by
the
court
adopted the
Services
and Technology
Act, administered
the Utah
State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,evidence
may contain errors.
concept that circumstantial
should be evaluated
by the jury on the same basis as direct evidence.

that possession or control of the drugs must be shown to
be exclusive before she can be convicted of unlawful
possession of narcotics.

However, contrary to the

assertions of the appellant, there was sufficient evidence
presented by the State at the trial that defendant's
possessionand control of the drugs was exclusive.

The

room in which the heroin was found was referred to by the
prosecution as "O"

(Tr.39), since the room was purportedly

a business office.
floor of Del's Cafe.

See Exhibit IP, a diagram of the second
The defense, however, referred to the

particular room in which the drugs were found as "room 6."
The defense counsel at the trial had his own diagram of the
second floor to which defense witnesses were directed, on
which the rooms were numbered.

This diagram, exhibit 9D

at the trial, did not come up with the rest of the record
on appeal.

However, it may be inferred from the testimony

of the defense witnesses, from the closing arguments of
the counsel for the defense (Tr.211,212), and appellant's
brief, page 2, that "room 6" was indeed the room in which
the drugs were discovered by the police officers.
The appellant tries to show that Robert Westley,
also known as "Billie," was living in, or had access to
the room where the narcotics were found, and thus that
the defendant's possession or control over the heroin
was not exclusive.

There was no substantial evidence

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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presented at the trial that Westley had any kind of control
over that room.

The testimony of one of the arresting

officers, Randall Anderson, was that the room was locked
with at least two locks, one of which was a dead bolt
type of lock (Tr.40).

Inside they found the heroin, as

well as business records, a cash register tray and some
money (Tr.53,54,80).

Also discovered in the room were

woman's clothing, jewelry and furs, all of which the
defendant admitted were her's (Tr.BO,l70).

In the nightstand

in which the heroin was found were also discovered by the
officers two envelopes, which were both addressed to the
defendant (Tr.41,66-69).

There were no articles of men's

clothing or shaving gear found in the room (Tr.54,81,87,189).
Upon being examined at the trial concerning his confrontation
with the defendant at the time of the arrest, Officer Randall
Anderson testified according to the following:
"Q.
(By Mr. Austin)
Where did
you come into contact with her on that
day.
A. Outside the office area there.
Q. Who was present when you were
talking to her?
A. Myself and Deputy George.
Q. Did you read her her rights?
A. Deputy George previously had
given her her rights.
Q. Did you ask her any questions
at that time?
A. Yes, I did.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Q. What questions did you
ask her?
A. I asked her if she had any
rent receipts for the other rooms
upstairs.
Q. What was her response to you
at that time?
A. She stated no she did not,
that she had friends who stayed in
there periodically. However, they
did not rent the rooms.
I then stated,
'In other words they're under your
control?' She said, 'That's right.'"
(Tr.66).
Officer Michael George also spoke with the
defendant at the time of her arrest.

He testified as

follows:
"Q. What questions did you ask
her regarding narcotics that you found
upstairs; alleged narcotics?
A. The first question I asked
her is who was slaying in the room,
the second on the right, which was
described where Deputy Anderson had
found the narcotics. She stated at
that time no one was staying there.
That was her business office, and
she had control over the office area.
Q. Did you ask her anything
further regarding that room?
A.
I did. She stated that she
had people staying there from time
to time. No one stayed in there
for the past few days.
She stated
that a party by the name of Billy
had been staying there, but stated
Billy was staying in her bedroom;
the first one on the left.
I asked
her who 'Billy' was.
She stated
that's her boyfriend who was later
identified as Robert Westley.

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
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Q. Did you ask her regarding
any keys to rooms on the other
floors?
A.
I did.
Q. What question did you ask?
A. She stated she had control
over all the rooms. She had the keys.
Q. She had the keys? Did you
ask her regarding the keys to this
particular room where the alleged
narcotics were found?
A. Yes, sir; I did.
She
stated that she had the only key
to that door.
That was the business
office at that time."
(Tr.82,83).
Under rebuttal direct examination by the
prosecution Officer George testified again concerning
statements made by the defendant at the time of her
arrest:
"Q. When you had this conversation with the defendant in this case,
after you read her her Hiranda rights,
did you ask her who had control of
that room?
A.
I did.
Q. What was her response?
A.
She stated she had exclusive
control to that room, and she had the
only key to that room.
Q.
You had a conversation 1.-rith
her regarding the man who's been
identified as Robert Westley?
A.
I did.
Q. What was the substance of
that conversation?
A. Well, when I asked her who was
staying in the room that I have just
described where the narcotics were
found, I asked her if anybody was
staying there.
She stated nobody was
staying there and nobody had been
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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staying there for the last few
days. However, her boy friend,
Billy, had been staying there a
few days ago."
{Tr.l89).
The defendant went on to tell Offic~r George that Billie,
i.e., Robert \vestley, was "staying in her bedroom; the
first one on the left." {Tr.82).

This is exactly the

room in which Officer Jim Duncan testified he found
Robert Westley in his pajamas {Tr.94,95).

The room in

which the heroin was discovered was the second room on
the right, at the top of the stairs {Tr.82).

See also

Exhibit lP.
Apparently there was some confusion on the part
of the defense as to who exactly did live in room 6, where
the heroin was found.

At the trial under direct examination

by defense counsel the defendant testified that Robert
Westley lived in room 7 rather than room 6 {Tr.l65).
Evidently the defendant changed her mind as to who was
living in room 6, in which the drugs were found, some time
prior to the trial.

In an "affidavit in support of motion

to suppress search warrant" {R.37), June 21, 1977,

the

defendant, under oath, testified that one Gwendolyn Faye
Campbell lived in the room, which the defense referred to at
the trial as "room 6."

The defendant at the trial, however,

testified that Gwendolyn Faye Campbell lived in roo~ 4 {Tr.
166).

The only witness for the defense who testified that

Westley
lived
in room
6 digitization
was Chalmers
Hood.
Hood
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for
provided by the Institute
of MuseumHowever,
and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

also testified that he did not arrive in Salt Lake City
until September of 1976 (Tr.llB).
place on July 14, 1976.

The arrest took

Officer George testified that

Hood was absolutely not present at that address when
the search warrant was executed (Tr.lBB).

Hood could not

possibly have known where Westley was living at the time
of the arrest.

All of the evidence presented by the

State at the trial points to the fact that the defendant
had exclusive control of the particular room where the
heroin was found on July 14, 1976.
Appellant tries to infer that Westley had
control of the room by giving evidence to show that the
heroin found on the person of Westley was similar to
that found in the room.

It does not follow from that

evidence that Westley had any kind of control over the
room, or access to the drugs therein.

The respondent does

not find the evidence compelling that the drugs found on
Westley and those found in the appellant's business office
were from the same stock.

However, even if they did come

from the same stock, the more logical explanation as to
how Westley obtained the heroin, which was found on him,
is that he got it from the appellant, with whom he had a
romantic relationship, according to her testimony at the
trial (Tr.l69).

Simply because Westley was found with

drugs
onthe S.J.
his
person
which
may
have
come
fromof Museum
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own stock which she kept in her business office does
not mean he had any kind of joint control over the drugs
with her.

The evidence shows that she possessed the

heroin in a large quantity with an intent to distribute
(Tr.69,85,99).

The fact of Westley's possession of

such drugs is simply evidence lhat she did indeed
distribute those narcotics which she kept locked in
her office.
There is sufficient circumstantial evidence
to support the finding of the jury that the drugs were
held with an intent to sell and distribute.

The amount

of heroin discovered was an unusually large quantity.
All three arresting officers who testified at the trial
gave their opinions that the heroin was held with an
intent to sell (Tr.69,85,99).

State v. Bankhead, supra

at 803, points out that circumstantial evidence may be
used to prove that the accused possessed the narcotics
for sale rather than for her individual use.
There was sufficient evidence presented at the
trial court from which the jury could conclude that the
defendant was guilty.

This Court stated in State v.

Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 1977):
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"The judging of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight of the evidence is exclusively
the prerogative of the jury. Consequently we are obliged to assume that
the jury believed those aspects of the
evidence, and drew those inferences
that reasonably could be drawn
therefrom, in the light favorable
to the verdict. In order for the
defendant to successfully challenge
and overturn a verdict on the ground
of insufficiency of the evidence, it
must appear that upon so viewing the
evidence, reasonable minds must
necessarily entertain a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed
the crime.
In applying the rules above
stated to the instant case, we are not
persuaded that the verdict should be
overturned." 565 P.2d at 68.
The Wilson case involved a prosecution for
possession of heroin with intent to distribute for value.
The defendant testified that he was out of town when the
alleged sale took place, while the prosecution's witness
testified that she had made the purchase from defendant
in Salt Lake City on the date in question.

The Court

stated that it was a proper function of the jury to
determine which of these obviously conflicting testimonies
it would believe.
The position of this Court concerning the review
of the sufficiency of evidence is further stated in State
v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216

(Utah 1976):
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"This court has long upheld
the standard that on an appeal
from conviction the court cannot
weigh the evidence nor say what
quantum is necessary to establish
a fact beyond a reasonable doubt
so long as the evidence given is
substantial. Further, this court
has maintained that its function
is not to determine guilt or
innocence, the weight to give
conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight
to be given defendant's testimony."
554 P.2d at 218.
The jury in the instant case has obviously chosen
to give more weight to the testimonies of the police officers!,
than to that of the defendant.

In this case, the testimony

of the witnesses for the prosecution afforded the jury a
substantial basis on which they could reasonably find that
the defendant constructively possessed the heroin by virtue
of her exclusive control over the room in which it was found.
Their determination of guilt should remain undisturbed.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO ALLOW
TESTIMONY FROM THE WITNESS JAMES HOUSLEY THAT ROBERT
WESTLEY OCCUPIED THE ROOM IN WHICH THE HEROIN WAS
DISCOVERED.
The appellant tries to show that Robert Westley
did have occupancy or control over the room in which the
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I

heroin was found on July 14, 1976.
unsound on several points.

Her argument is

Defense counsel claims

this case is a Brady v. Maryland problem, and that the
prosecution attempted to cover up evidence and also that
the prosecution removed certain evidence from the
courtroom during the trial.

Appellant neglects to point

out in her brief that the evidence which was removed from
the courtroom was the four balloons of heroin found on
Westley, Exhibit 7D.

This was done as a result of a

misunderstanding between Mr. Leedy, counsel for the
defense, and Mr. Austin, the prosecutor (Tr.57-63).

The

four balloons were quickly returned to the courtroom once
it was apparent what had happened (Tr.63).

The court ruled

that the chain of evidence for the defense was not broken
(Tr.63).
This case is definitely not similar to Brady v.
Maryland, 373

u.s.

83

(1963).

In Brady, the defense counsel

had requested the prosecution to allow him to examine the
extrajudicial statements of the defendant's companion.
Several of these were shown to him; but one in which the
companion admitted the actual killing was withheld by the
prosecution and did not come to the petitioner's notice
until after he had been tried, convicted and sentenced.

In

the case now before the Court there is absolutely no evidence
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that the prosecution withheld any evidence during the
trial, which might be favorable to the appellant, nor is
there evidence that the defense counsel made any request
for such evidence, as had been made in the Brady case.
Housley had visited Del's Cafe and had seen Westley!
I

getting out of bed but was unable to say exactly when, other

I

I

than that he had known Westley "from late December of 1975
until sometime in the summer of 1976" and that the date of
his visit was "prior to the time that Dell was arrested on
this charge."

(Tr.l33).

Housley was not a prosecutor for

the county attorney's office at the time he visited Del's
Cafe and saw Westley (Tr.l30).
The evidence which the defense was trying 1:o
introduce through Housley's testimony was properly excluded
by the judge.

The issue here is whether Westley had control

or occupancy of the room in which the heroin was found on
July 14, 1976.

Housley knew nothing as to this issue.

Jones on Evidence, 6th Ed., sec. 4.1, p. 379, states:
"A witness having no knowledge
of the proposition which is the
subject of proof could hardly be
expected to give relevant testimony."
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 45, give the judge
the discretion to exclude evidence if he feels that its
probative value is outweighed by other considerations.
See also McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence, 2d
ed., pp. 438-440.

This discretionary power of the judge
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to exclude evidence is very broad, Martin v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 565 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1977); Williams v. Queen Fisheries,
2 Wash.App. 691, 469 P.2d 583 (1966); Olson v. Hardware
Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 45 Wis.2d 569, 173 N.W.2d 599
(1970).

If there was any probative value in the excluded

testimony of Housley the trial judge evidently felt it was
outweighed by its remoteness in time, and the inability of
Housley to say when his visit took place.

Evans v. Gaisford,

122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d 431 (1952), held that remoteness of
the evidence to the issue is one of the elements the judge
can take into consideration in weighing its probative value.
The trial judge here did not abuse his discretion in sustaining
the objection to Housley's testimony, which would have had
little if any probative value in showing that the appellant
did not have exclusive control over her locked office in
which the heroin was kept on July 14, 1976.
At the trial the counsel for the defense made a
proffer of evidence, concerning the testimony of Housley
which was excluded by the judge (Tr.l33-134).

This proffer

was not recorded and is nowhere contained in the record.
The only place the proffer is mentioned is Appellant's Brief.
This, however, is insufficient in an appeal.

The Utah Court

in Watkins v. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406, 385 P.2d 155 (1963),
stated:

"This court cannot consider facts stated in the
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briefs which may be true but absent in the official record,"
See also Cooper v. Foresters Underwriters, Inc., 123 Utah
215, 257 P.2d 540 (1953); Skyline v. Datacap, 545 P.2d 512
(Utah 1976).

Appellant's proffer should not be considered

by the court in this appeal by virtue of its not being
properly within the record.
A.

EVEN IF SUCH TESTIMONY FROM HOUSLEY SHOULD

HAVE BEEN ALLOWED, IT WAS A HARMLESS ERROR FOR THE COURT
TO REFUSE TO ALLOW IT.
Even if the testimony of Housley had been admitted I
by the court, and it was shown that Westley had had access
to or occupancy of the room previous to the execution of the

I

search warrant no prejudicial error would have been committee.!
Were this the case, the ruling of the lmver court should stiLl
stand, under Utah Code Ann.

§

77-42-l (1953).

The fact

I

that other persons may have had access to the room in which I
the narcotics were found will not necessarily disturb a
finding that there was constructive possession of the
narcotics by the defendant.

The Illinois court in People

v. Embry, 20 Ill.2d 331, 169 N.E.2d 767 (1960), said:
"In People v. Mack, 12 Ill.2d
151, 145 N.E.2d 609, we held that
where narcotics were found in an
apartment which had been rented to
the defendant, the element of
possession was established, in
spite of the fact that other persons
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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had access to the apartment.
The proof here that defendant
paid the rent on the apartment
and was present when the drugs
were found therein is sufficient
to establish that he was in
possession of them, in spite of
the fact that other persons were
likewise present at the time."
169 N.E.2d at 769.
The Illinois Court held similarly in People v. Nettles,
23 Ill.2d 306, 178 N.E.2d 361 (1961).

In Nettles, when

the police arrested the defendant he told them "anything
you find in the apartment is mine."

The defendant was

convicted even though there were three others present in
his apartment at the time of the search.

The statement of

the defendant in Nettles is similar to those made by the
defendant in the instant case when she told the arresting
officer that she was in control of the entire premises on
the second floor and in exclusive control of the room
containing the drugs (Tr.66,82,83,189).
In State v. Villavicencio, 108 Ariz. 518, 502
P.2d 1337 (1972), the defendant was found guilty of
possession of drugs which had been hidden in a box found
next to his apartment building.

The court affirmed and

ruled that the defendant constructively possessed the
drugs even though the area was "completely open and
accessible to anybody who would want to walk through."
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The court said "Exclusive control of the place in which
the narcotics are found is not necessary."

Supra at 1339.

Numerous other cases support this proposition.
There is also a line of cases in which courts
have held that where drugs were found on premises of
which the defendant was in nonexclusive possession,
the fact that they were found among or near his personal
belongings was a circumstance sufficient to link him with
possession of such drugs.

In People v. Flores, 155 Cal.App.k

347, 318 P.2d 65 (1957), the court affirmed the conviction of
the defendant for possession of heroin.

The drugs had been

discovered in the pocket of a jacket in a closet along with
two blank applications one of v-'hich bore the defendant 1 s
name.

A pair of pants belonging to the defendant was also

found in the closet.

The proximity of belongings of the

defendant to the drugs, even though "quite a few people had
access to the house" was sufificent circumstantial evidence
upon which the jury could have found the defendant guilty.
In the instant case the heroin was found in a nightstand

al~l

containing two envelopes which were addressed to the
defendant (Tr.41,66-69).

In the room were discovered

clothing, jewelry, money, and business receipts, all of
which belonged to the defendant (Tr.53,54,80).

The proximi0l

of the drugs to her own personal belongings would have been I
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.
-22-

sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty even
if she were shown to have had nonexclusive possession
of the premises.
POINT III
THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE THE DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NOS. 1 AND 3 CONCERNING ACCESS TO OR
EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OF A ROOM WHERE NARCOTICS ARE FOUND.
Among others the court gave the following
instruction which focused primarily on the elements of
the crime required by Utah Code Ann.
1973),

§

58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (Supp.

the statute under which the defendant was charged:
"INSTRUCTION NO. 12. Before
you can convict the defendant of the
crime of UNLA\'7FUL POSSESSION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO
DISTRIBUTE FOR VALUE, you must find
from the evidence, beyond a reasonable
doubt, all of the following elements
of that crime:
1. That on or about the 14th
day of July, 1976, in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the defendant, Willie
Mae Walker, unlawfully possessed a
controlled substance, namely, heroin.
2. That such possession by
defendant was intentional.
3. That such controlled substance
was knowingly possessed by defendant.
4. That such possession of the
controlled substance by the defendant
was with the intent to distribute it
for value.
If you believe that the evidence
establishes each and all of the essential
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict
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the defendant. On the other hand,
if the evidence has failed to so
establish one or more of said
elements then you should find the
defendant not guilty."
(R.71).
The court, through Instruction 11, instructed
the jury as to the legal definition of the word "possession"

i

in accordance with the definition give in Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-2 (26)

(Supp. 1973):
"The word 'possession' means
the joint or individual ownership,
control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, obtaining,
as distinguished from distribution, of
controlled substances and includes
individual, joint or group possession
of controlled substances. For a person
to be a possessor of a controlled
substance, it is not required that
he be shown to have individually
possessed, the controlled substance,
but it is sufficient if it is shown
that he jointly participated with one
or more persons in the possession of
any substance with knowledge that such
activity was occurring."
(R.70).

The general rule with regard to jury instructions

I

is that there is no grounds for reversal where the instructiorl
was non-prejudicial and that if an error was committed, "A
reasonable probability of a more favorable result, for
defendant, in the absence of such error, must exist."
State v. Hutcheson, No. 15390 (May 30, 1978); State v.
Romeo, 42 Utah 46, 128 Pac. 530 (1912); State v. Condit,
101 Utah 558, 125 P.2d 801 (1942).
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The Court stated in State v. Thompson, 110 Utah
113, 170 P.2d 153 (1946):
it is the duty of the
court to apply the law to the facts
supported by the evidence and to not
instruct on any question which is
not involved in the case under the
evidence." 170 P.2d at 162.
The instructions which were given fairly addressed
themselves to the facts of the case as were presented at the
trial and supported by the evidence.

The instructions

proposed by the appellant were properly refused for several
reasons:
1. The language of appellant's proposed instruction
does not focus on the facts supported by the evidence presented
at the trial.

Appellant's proposed Instruction No. 3 states:
"The mere fact that Willie May
Walker may have had access to the room
where the heroin was found is insufficient
evidence to prove that she had possession
or control of the substance found therein."
(R. 95).

The weight of the evidence strongly suggests that
defendant's access to the room was more than a "mere fact."
The evidence presented as discussed in Point I shows that she
did indeed have exclusive control of the room.

Appellant's

requested instructions would have had the effect of watering
down the evidence presented and of confusing or misleading the
jury.
2.

Appellant cited no case authority from Utah
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showing that where others had access to a room in which
narcotics are found the defendant cannot be found guilty
of constructive possession.

Courts across the nation have

gone both ways on this issue and respondent would suggest
as was shown in Point II(A), that the more reasonable theory I
is the one which requires an examination of all the facts
and circumstances of the case, and which allows for joint
possession or control.

The jury instruction which was

given did allow for joint possession or control, in
with Utah statute.

accord~a,

For the court to have given appellant's

proposed jury Instruction Nos. 1 and 3 would have been to
presume an interpretation of law which was not necessarily
the correct one, and which avoided the facts supported by
the evidence at the trial.
There was no prejudicial error in the instructiom
which were given and the verdict should not be disturbed.
POINT IV
THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE FROr1 THE UPPER
FLOOR OF APPELLANT'S PREMISES WERE BOTH LAWFUL AND SUCH
EVIDENCE SHOULD BE PERMITTED AT TRIAL.
After swearing out a search warrant affidavit
before Salt Lake City Judge M. D. Jones, the police officers
went to the premises in question to conduct a search for
illegally possessed heroin.

The underlying basis of
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three distinct circumstances of the search o£ the rooms on

the second floor:

(a)

since all the rooms were used by the

occupants in a common or joint usage, the police officers
were justified in searching the upper floor thoroughly;

(b)

neither the outward appearance of appellant's premises nor
the licensing for hotel purposes were present so as to give
the policemen prior notice of the upper floor's use;

(c)

searches must be judged according to what fair-minded persons
would regard as proper in determining both if the search was
valid and in assessing what is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment requirements.
Before these three subpoints can be discussed,
an initial foundation of the sufficiency of the search
warrant's probable cause must be

laid~

Where information from

informants is used in securing a search warrant and the
sufficiency of probable cause is in question, Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257

(1960), is regarded as setting forth the

dispositive criteria for the supporting affidavit.

Jones

involved a search warrant for the suspected use of narcotics,
the basis of which was information supplied by two informants.
The affiant police officer had no personal knowledge of the
use of drugs on the premises.

The Supreme Court upheld the

affidavit supporting the search warrant, ruling:
"The question here is whether
an affidavit which sets out personal
observations relating to the existence
of cause to search is to be deemed
by virtue
the offact
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinneyinsufficient
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that it sets out not the affiant's
observations but those of another.
An affidavit is not to be deemed
insufficient on that score, so long
as a substantial basis for crediting
the hearsay is presented.
In testing the sufficiency of
probable cause for an officer's action
even without a warrant, we have held
that he may rely upon information
received through an informant, rather
than upon his direct observations, so
long as the informant's statement is
reasonably corroborated by other matters
within the officer's knowledge."
362
u.s. at 269.
As to corroboration, the court further stated:
"The informant had previously
given accurate information. His story
was corroborated by other sources of
information. And petitioner was known
by the police to be a user of narcotics.
Corronoration through other sources of
information reduced the chances of a
reckless or prevaricating tale • • • • "
Id. at 271.
This "substantial basis" test of Jones was accept~!
in the Utah case of State v. Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2dl
846 (1972).

The defendant in Treadway was convicted of

unlawfully possessing marijuana.

The basis for the search

warrant involved was information phoned in by the manager of
a motel who had observed the marijuana in the defendant's
room.

The affiant also swore that another officer had

conducted a surveillance and believed the drugs were present.
This Court found the affidavit was sufficient and enunciated
the following standard:
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"An affidavit may be based on
hearsay information and need not reflect
the direct, personal observations of the
affiant; however, the magistrate must be
informed of some of the underlying
circumstances from which the affiant
concluded that the informant was credible
or his information reliable. The probability, and not a prima facie showing, of
criminal activity is the standard of
probable cause. The magistrate is
obligated to render a judgment based
upon a common-sense reading of the
affidavit. Although the information is
almost completely hearsay, the warrant
may be upheld, if there be sufficient
information in the affidavit to prove a
'substantial basis' for crediting the
hearsay."
(Citations omitted.)
Id. at 847-848.
In accord, State v. Fort, 572 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977).
The facts in the instant case satisfy the
standards established by Jones and Treadway.

That is,

affiant George had a "substantial basis" for giving credit
to the two confidential informants' observations regarding
appellant's drug activities.

The informants' past histories

of supplying information which resulted in the arrest "of
several felons" and providing "names, addresses and telephone
numbers of known narcotics dealers, which information has
subsequently been verified" support George's reliance on
the information.

(State's Exhibit A.)

Affiant's state-

ments concerning the two informants' assertions were
sufficient to allow a magistrate to find that the confidential sources were reliable and credible.
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A.

IT IS CLEAR THAT THERE WAS COMMON USAGE BY APP[

LANT 1 S ASSOCIATES AND ROOMERS OF ALL ROOMS ON THE SECOND FLOO!
As was noted in the statement of facts, appellant
was very generous in providing shelter for her friends and
acquaintances.

These occupants were allowed to inhabit

the upper floor rooms with or without paying rent, depending
on if the roomers had the money to pay rent {Tr.66,176-177).
The open living room area and shared bathroom, kitchen and
hallway facilities point to the common usage aspect of the
second floor.
The facts and circumstances of the search here are ~
very similar to three cases in which search warrants were
uphelc1.

In State v. Tapp, 26 Utah 2d 392, 490 P.2d 334 (19711

a search warrant was issued even though the affiant did not
stipulate precisely whether the defendant was in possession
of some alleged marijuana or whether defendant was indeed
residing at the address listed on the warrant.

Yet this

Court ruled that the search which uncovered the suspected
marijuana was proper.

In assessing the validity of the

search warrant, the court declared:
" • • • it is not necessary that
the affiant have certain knowledge
of the commission of c1:ime or of the
location of evidence incident thereto.
It is only required that there be
sufficient knowledge of the probability
thereof that a person of reason and
prudence would act thereon."
490 P.2d
at 337.
(Emphasis added.)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-30-

Thus, the Utah Court has ruled that the location
of evidence to be seized is necessary in the warrant only
to the extent that the affiant has "sufficient knowledge of
the probability" that the evidence would be found on the
premises.

Certain knowledge is not the test.
Here the confidential informants obtained informa-

tion that heroin was being used and sold on the upper floor
of appellant's premises.

The search warrant was based on

that information and the "sufficient knowledge" test of
~

was met.
With respect to the common usage of the second

floor rooms, the California Supreme Court ruled in People v.
Gorg, 157 Cal.App.2d 515, 321 P.2d 143 (1958), that joint
occupancy by criminal suspects will justify a search of all
the rooms in the apartment.

In Gorg, defendant and two

other persons, Fontaine and Hyde, rented an apartment with
three bedrooms but common bathroom, kitchen and living room.
Each tenant paid rent separately to the landlord and shared
utility expenses.

The three bedrooms opened into the

common living room.

The warrant named Fontaine and authorized

a search of "all rooms and buildings used in connection with
the premises.

Gorg appealed his conviction when

incriminating evidence was uncovered in the search of the
entire premise.

In response to Gorg's claim that the search
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was illegal, the California court determined that:
"While a search warrant for
one building on a tract of land
occupied by a named person will not
justify a search of another separate
building on the same tract of land
occupied by another person [citations
omitted], and will not justify a
search of a separate floor of the
same building occupied by an unnamed
tenant [citations omitted] such rule
only applies where there are separate
and distinct living quarters occupied
by different persons. A rule of
reason must be applied. Here the
living unit was one distinct unit
occupied by three persons. When the
police, pursuant to the warrant, searched
the living room and found marijuana, and
then searched Fontaine's bedroom and
found marijuana, they acted as reasonable
and prudent men in searching the other two
bedrooms that were unlocked and an integral
art of the same livin
uarters."
321 P.2d
at 148.
(Emphasis added.
In the instant case, there were no separate and
distinct living quarters (Tr.40), and, in fact, the upper
floor area was one distinct living unit not only because
of the numerous common areas shared by all the occupants,
but also because appellant had control over the whole second
floor (Tr.66,82-83).

Thus, the Gorg ruling is very much

on point here in that the police officers acted as prudent
and reasonable men in searching all the rooms on the upper
floor, especially since, as in Gorg, the rooms other than
the officer were "unlocked and an integral part of the
same living quarters."
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One last case may be cited with regard to common
occupancy.

In Renner v. State, 187 Tenn. 647, 216 S.W.2d

345 (1948), a suspected criminal and another person were
sharing an upper floor consisting of five separate rooms
at No. 1476 1/2 Market Street.

Two rooms were rented to

defendant and three rooms were rented to one McKinney.
The court declared "parenthetically, that both parties
seemed to make themselves at horne all over the place like
one big family having a common interest."

When defendant

objected to the search warrant being incompetent on
appeal, the court rejected his contention because:
the warrant does not
purport to confine the search to
only that part of the described
premises which is occupied by a
specified person, . • • but purports
to direct a search of all of 1476 1/2
Market St. without regard to what
person or persons may separately
occupy separate portions of that
address • • • It results that the
description was sufficiently
specific, if a search may validly be
issued to search a specified premises
without naming the person or persons in
possession of the premises." 216 S.W.2d
at 347.
Just as the "sufficiently specific" requirement is
set out by the Tennessee court, a similar test must be met
in this state.

Utah Code Ann.

§

77-54-7

(Supp. 1973), declares

that search warrants must describe the place to be searched
with "reasonable particularity."

In the present case, the
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affidavit for search warrant gave adequate "reasonable
particularity" when directing the search to be made of the

1

premises located at 511-513 West Second South "adjoinding
buildings known as Del's Cafe and rooms apurtenant thereto
(State's Exhibit A), for the following reasons:
the premises share a party wall and have only one entrance
that allows access to both buildings; the two buildings are
actually one single unit under the undivided control of
appellant; even if there are one or more persons present in
the unit it is immaterial without a showing that' such
persons are tenants in the sense that they have a residence
there exclusive of appellant's overriding control.

This has

not been shown by appellant.
As is stated in 11 A.L.R.3d at 1341-42:
"The general rule that a search
warrant directed against a multipleoccupancy structure must particularize
respecting the subunit to be searched
is usually held inapplicable where the
premises in question are occupied by
several families or persons in common
rather than individually, or where it
is shown that notwithstanding the joint
occupancy, defendant was in control of
the whole of the premises."
It is respondent's position that the facts do not
support the conclusion that the two buildings involved
constitute a multi-occupancy dwelling as relied on by appellt\
in United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324

(C.A. 7, 1955), but I

serve as a single unit controlled exclusively by one person I
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meets the particularity requirements of the Utah Code.
As to the reference to the search of a male
person known only as "Billie," whether this is an adequate
description for the purpose of a lawful search of "Billie"
has no relevance to the lawful search of the premises.
The warrant's particularity and lawfulness will not stand
or fall on the additional warrant purpose of the search
of "Billie."

Martini v. State, 200 Md. 609, 92 A.2d 456

(1952); In ReG., 64 Misc.2d 129, 314 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1970).
B.

OUTWARD APPEARANCE DID NOT INDICATE NOR WAS

THERE ANY LICENSE TO INDICATE THAT THE UPPER FLOOR WAS A
HOTEL, APARTMENT BUILDING OR ROOMING HOUSE.
It has been held that where the multi-unit
character of the premises is not externally apparent and
it was known to the officer applying for and executing
the warrant, there is no requirement that the affidavit
or search warrant specify the subunit to be searched.
United States v. Santore, 290 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.
1952l,cert. den. 365

u.s.

834 (1960).

In Santore,

defendant contended that since the house which was
searched was not a one-family house, but two-family--the
basement and second floor being occupied by one family
and the first floor by another--the warrant did not
describe the premises with proper particularity.

Defendant
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moved to suppress all evidence because of a claimed illegal
search and seizure.

In rejecting the Hinton, supra, dis-

tinction, the court ruled:
we think that the
issued warrant described the premises
to be searched with that 'practical
accuracy' we have held to be necessary.
[Citations omitted.]
The description
in the warrant was in accordance with
the outward appearance of the stru~ture,
[citations omitted] and in view of the
concealment by Orlando [a co-defendant]
of the interior alteration made by him
it would be absurd to say that the
Government was on notice as to it.
The agents were not warned of a possible
dual occupancy of the house until
after they had shown the copy of the
warrant to Orlando and had entered inside.
At that moment it was too late for them,
consistent with the success of their
mission, to have retreated and obtained
a new warrant." 290 F.2d at 67.
In the present case, an inquiry to the Salt Lake
City licensing and health departments would have revealed
that no licenses existed for the operation of the premises
as a dwelling for more than one family or person.

As noted

by appellant in her testimony at trial and in a deposition
for affidavit in opposition to the search warrant, the
premises had previously been used as a hotel, but the license I
for such use had been allowed to lapse (Tr.l77;R.4).

Thus,

the police officers involved in the search should be allowed
the justifiable inference that the premises were no longer
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a multiunit structure and, in accordance with Santore, supra,
should not be penalized for the description of the premises
as set down in the search warrant.
C.

SEARCHES MUST BE JUDGED ACCORDING TO WHAT

FAIR-MINDED PERSONS WOULD REGARD AS PROPER IN DETERMINING
WHAT IS REASONABLE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIREMENTS.
A basic, common-sense standard has been established
by this Court in determining whether searches are proper or
not.

In State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517

(1968), it was noted that courts should be wary of applying
the principle of constitutional protection against unreasonable searches too broadly.

The Court determined that while

unjustifiable searches were surely to be voided, as
guaranteed by the Constitution:
" • • • it is equally important
that such protections be applied
in circumstances they were intended
to cover and that they do not become
so extended beyond their reasons for
being that even where there is no
danger or likelihood of any such
abuse, they provide a cloak of
protection by which those engaged
in criminal activities may escape
detection and punishment. The
essential thing is to keep within
the reasonable middle ground,
between the protecting of the
law-abiding citizenry from highhanded or officious intrusions into
their private affairs; and the
imposing of undue restrictions upon
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conscientious officers doing their
duty in the investigation of crime.
It was undoubtedly in an awareness
of the desirability of avoiding the
difficulty just mentioned that the
language of the Fourth Amendment does
not denounce all searches, but only
those which are 'unreasonable.'
The question to be answered is
whether under the circumstances the
search or seizure is one which fairminded persons, knowing the facts, and
giving due consideration to the
Lights and interests of the public,
as well as to those of the suspect,
would judge to be an unreasonable
or oppressive intrusion against the
latter's rights." 444 P.2d at 519.
This same reasoning 1vas echoed again by this Court
in State v. Richards, 26 Utah 2d 318, 489 P.2d 422

(1971);

State v. Kaae, 30 Utah 2d 73, 513 P.2d 435 (1973); State v.
Farnsworth, 30 Utah 2d 435,

~J

9 P.2d 244

(1974); State v.

Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976); and State v. Folkes, 565
P. 2d 1125 (Utah 1977).
In the instant case, neither the magistrate who
approved the warrant nor the trial judge considered the
search to be unreasonable.

In light of the Criscola test,

such determination should be given great weight when the
validity of the warrant is questioned by appellant on appeal. I
POINT V
EVIDENCE MAY PROPERLY BE SEIZED WHEN IN THE COURSE
OF A LEGAL SEARCH OFFICERS INADVERTENTLY COME ACROSS
INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE IN PLAIN VIEW.
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I

The envelopes found in appellant's office
were ancillary evidence further establishing that she
was the occupant of the room where the heroin was
discovered (Tr.41,66-69).

While the envelopes were

not listed on the search warrant as items to be seized,
the case of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403

u.s.

443

(1971), holds that there are specific circumstances
when unlisted items may be taken as evidence.

Coolidge

notes that while police may seize evidence in plain view
without a warrant, it is crucial that such "plain view"
seizures be allowed only within a very narrow framework.
After the Supreme Court listed the two constitutional
objectives of search warrant requirements--magistrate's
scrutiny to eliminate searches not based on adequate
probable cause and the limitation of searches so as to
avoid the abhorrent "general search"--the court ruled:
[t]he plain view' doctrine
is not in conflict with the first
objective because plain vievT does not
occur until a search is in progress.
In each case, this initial intrusion
is justified by a warrant or by an
exception such as 'hot pursuit' or
search incident to a lawful arrest,
or by an extraneous valid reason for
the officer's presence. And, given
the initial intrusion, the seizure

-39-
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of an object in plain view is
consistent with the second
objective, since it does not convert the search into a general or
exploratory one. As against the
minor peril to Fourth Amendment
protections, there is a major gain
in effective law enforcement. lvhere,
once an otherwise lawful search is
in progress, the police inadvertently
come upon a piece of evidence, it would
often be a needless inconvenience,
and sometimes dangerous--to the evidence
or to the police themselves--to require
them to ignore it until they have obtained
a warrant particularly describing it."
403 u.s. at 467-468.
Thus, Coolidge allows "plain

view" incriminating

evidence to be seized if a lawful search is already under
way.

This was clearly the case in the present matter at

bar, since the envelopes were discovered in the same
nightstand where the heroin was found. (Tr.66-69).
This Court has upheld the "plain

view" theory in

the recent case of State v. Folkes, supra.

Here a criminal

activity of illegal drug use was observed by two policemen ·
I
who proceeded to arrest the suspects and gather incriminating
I

evidence.

This Court held the police officers:
could take anything in
the immediate area which was so
involved in the criminal conduct
that it would serve as evidence in
proof of the crime. Though the
bottle from which the narcotic had
been taken was placed on the dresser
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in the adjoining bedroom, it was in
the immediate vicinity; and it was in
plain view in that no search was
required to discover it.
In fact
the charge that there was a 'search'
in this case is for that reason
a distortion of language, because
there was really no 'search' involved."
565 P.2d at 1127-1128.
A parallel can be drawn to the present case:
the envelopes were seized in the "immediate vicinity" of
the 56 balloons of heroin; the envelopes would serve as
"evidence in proof of the crime"

(i.e., possession); and

the envelopes were in "plain view in that no search was
required to discover [them]."
The Utah Court has also upheld this "plain view"
rationale in State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 2d 129, 499 P.2d
276 (1972); State v. Allred, 16 Utah 2d 41, 395 P.2d 535
(1964); State v. Martinez, 28 Utah 2d 80, 498 P.2d 651
(1972); and State v. Kaae, supra.
Another important aspect of the envelope's
admissibility is the United States Supreme Court's
determination that there is no basis in distinguishing
"mere evidence" seized in a la>vful search from fruits
or instrumentalities of crime or contraband.
Hayden, 387

u.s.

294

(1964).

Warden v.

The Court there ruled:
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[n]othing in the
language of the Fourth Amendment
supports the distinction between
'mere evidence' and instrumentalities,
fruits of crime, or contraband.
On
its face, the provision assures the
'right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and
effects • • • ,'without regard to the
use to which any of these things are
applied. This 'right of the people' is
certainly unrelated to the 'mere evidence'
limitation. Privacy is disturbed no
more by a search directed to a purely
evidentiary object than it is by a search
directed to an instrumentality, fruit, or
contraband." 387 U.S. at 301-302.
This same rationale 1r1as used in State v. Jones,
202 Kansas 31, 446 P.2d 851 (1968), where the seizure of a
handkerchief with the defendant's monogrammed initial on
it was deemed proper because it was "lying in close proximity
to the • 32 caliber pistol"
of a murder).

(which was used in the commission

The court rejected defendant's claim that the

handkerchief was "mere evidence" and should therefore be
excluded.

The Kansas high court held that "the mere evidence :

rule was never the law in Kansas • • • and the Supreme Court
of the United States recently abandoned the mere evidence
rule in Warden v. Hayden."

446 P.2d at 866.

The seizure of the handkerchief in Jones and the
seizure of the envelopes in the instant case are most
analogous.

Both were discovered in "close proximity" to

the crucial evidence (i.e., pistol in Jones and heroin in
the
present
case)
and for
both
linked
defendants
to Services
the
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crime.

Respondent submits further that both were properly

seized within the scope of the searches.

The envelopes

were important bridging evidence which were in plain view
during the course of the legal search and were properly
seized to afix appellant's control over the office where
the incriminating heroin was found.
CONCLUSION
Respondent contends that there was sufficient
evidence presented at the tiral upon which the jury could
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
guilty of unlawful possession of heroin.

The weight of the

evidence showed that she had exclusive control over the
room in which the heroin was discovered on July 14, 1976.
The testimony of James Housley regarding the previous
occupation of that room by Robert Westley was properly
excluded by the judge, since Housley was unable to say
exactly when he had visited the premises and seen Westley.
The trial judge properly used his discretion in
refusing to allow that testimony since it might have
confused the issues or misled the jury had it been permitted.
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to
give the defendant's proposed Instruction Nos. l and 3.
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Even if an error had been committed there was no reasonable
probability that a decision more favorable to the defendant
would have resulted.

There was no error on the part of

the judge.
The search conducted of the upper floor rooms
was a proper action by the police officers since all the
rooms were under appellant's control, no prior indication
was given the officers regarding the unlicensed use of the
seconn floor as a rooming house and the search was reasonable and fair under the circumstances.
The two envelopes seized were clearly in "plain
view" and were properly gathered as incriminating evidence
against appellant.

They were also in "close proximity"

to the seized heroin.
Respondent asserts that the rulings of the lower
court were proper and prays that the decision be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
MICHAEL L. DEM1ER

Deputy Attorney General
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